By: Ahmad Zaidan
Translation: L24
Four Failed Attempts to Reform Assad was originally published on Arabi 21 and was translated from Arabic to English and edited by L24. The Arabic essay by Ahmad Zaidan, a Syrian journalist and political analyst, examines the most recent overtures of reformation and normalization with the Assad regime, by Turkey, and puts it into context regarding the broader efforts at restoring political ties with a regime that has murdered and displaced millions.
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For more than a week, the leader of the Syrian regime, Bashar al-Assad, has not responded to the claims of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to meet him and visit Turkey. He has taken one or two steps that have “not been disclosed.” Despite the repeated invitations from the Turkish leadership, represented by President Erdogan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, the head of the Syrian regime is committed to silence. Whoever understood and interpreted this as diplomatic shrewdness, as if Bashar was making his own decisions and taking them into his own hands, is mistaken and does not realize the reality in Syria, which is no longer what it was before March 15, 2011, the day the Syrian revolution began.
We must face Syria’s present reality, which is that there are ten foreign armies there, each representing a country with interests, concerns, and worries. Therefore, it is difficult for a nation, no matter how great it is, to decide the fate of the battle and the fate of the country. If mathematical analysis gives weight to each international and local player in any issue, then each of these players has its own weight, which increases the risks in the Syrian scene and prevents any one country from making a decision deciding the fate of Syria which is led by the combined interests of all the nations gathered in it.
In addition to the presence of these armies, more than 66 armed sectarian militias are present on Syrian soil, in addition to the revolutionary players present on the ground as well, represented by the myriad military forces, many of which have expressed their absolute rejection of any solution that does not include the overthrow of Assad. With them are the heirs of the million martyrs, in addition to 14 million displaced persons, who refuse to once again return to Assad’s fold.
In light of the experiences since 2017, more than one country has sought to entice the Syrian regime to rehabilitate it, attempting to distance it from the Iranian embrace, but all the experiments were thus far unsuccessful, or at least not encouraging. All historical evidence indicates that the regime, since the days of its founder Hafez al-Assad, has been accustomed to deceiving the Arabs and its interlocutors with the desire to separate from Iran, while at the same time strengthening its relations with it.
Today, the issue of normalization is far from being a strengthening of these relationships – in light of Iran’s control over everything on the ground – which is completely contrary to the Russian role. The ubiquitous nature of Iranian military, political, social, economic, educational, and other manifestations reflect the extent of Tehran’s penetration into the joints of the Syrian state and society, which makes it impossible for the Syrian regime to ignore all these facts on the ground. Thus, imposing actual, as opposed to theoretical, restrictions on it – even if it wanted to move away from them, even a little.
The first experiments in rehabilitating the Syrian regime were at the hands of the Emirates when it sought what it described as “distancing the regime from the Iranian embrace,” only to find out years later the impossibility of this wishful approach. Despite all the meaningless cosmetic steps taken by the regime to convince its negotiators, on the ground, the Iranian presence only increased and its penetration grew.
Years after the Emirati experiment, Jordan sought to be a representative of the Arab League in a policy called “step by step,” to rehabilitate the Syrian regime, but the Jordanian process was hijacked by Saudi Arabia when it invited Bashar al-Assad to attend the Arab summit, which Amman saw as a blow to its entire policy and strategy in Syria. This reality tempted the Syrian regime to pressure everyone, and that was by intensifying drug smuggling, which was later upgraded to smuggling weapons and explosives to Jordan, and sought to turn it into a transit station to the Gulf and beyond.
It appears today that Jordan views the Syrian regime as having thwarted its plan to rehabilitate it, taking advantage of playing on the differences within the Arab ranks. The same thing happened, by the way, with the Saudi-Assad rapprochement, where it became clear that the regime cannot accept the Arab conditions, whether Emirati, Jordanian or Saudi and is even working to increase its transgressions regarding them. Both in response to the Iranians and out of a desire to take revenge on the Arab states, which it blames for what happened in Syria, as it still denies the legitimate internal popular demands.
Today, Turkey is entering the reconciliation process, and in my opinion, the experience will not be any better than previous Arab experiences. Assad is not subject to change, and his promises cannot be trusted.
Firstly, because he is not trustworthy according to his history, and secondly because he has lost his will. Perhaps what happened to his media advisor Luna al-Shibl, and what was reported about the Iranian Revolutionary Guard investigating her and then killing her, confirms that the Iranian side is ready to take extreme measures towards the Syrian regime and its symbols, and therefore the issue is extremely complex. I do not believe that the Russians alone can force Assad to do something that contradicts Iranian desires or clashes with them.
It remains to be said that throughout the years of the revolution, we have not seen any concessions from Assad and his allies towards the revolution and those described as allies of the revolution, while we have seen the opposite from the allies of the revolution who have sought throughout those years to make concessions for him, at the revolution’s expense and those of its people, which has strengthened his intransigence and adherence to his positions.
Lastly, the practical response to all of this is for the revolutionary factions to unite and present a unified program that is consistent with the popular demands of the people, and then the tables will begin to be turned on the regime, its masters, and its supporters.
