By: Obayda Amer Ghadban
In the second part of his deep dive into post-Assad Syria, Obayda Amer Ghadban, a PhD student in War Studies at King’s College London, examines the risks Israel now faces as its strategy provokes backlash from local populations, Turkey, and global powers. While Part one charted Israel’s incursion and objectives, this installment analyzes how the very tactics Israel uses—from military raids to minority alliances—may ignite the instability they profess to contain.
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In the early spring of 2025, as Israeli tanks rolled through dusty villages in southern Syria and warplanes patrolled skies far beyond the Golan Heights, the question in regional capitals wasn’t how Israel had moved so fast—but how long it could hold its ground. What began as a blitz to neutralize threats after Assad’s fall has morphed into something far messier: an open-ended campaign tangled in sectarian politics, uneasy alliances, and growing international blowback.
Strategic Overreach or Security Doctrine?
Israel’s aggressive approach in post-Assad Syria is not without serious constraints and potential pitfalls. As the months wear on, a chorus of regional and international voices—and even some within Israel—are warning that this strategy of open-ended military intervention could backfire badly. One major concern is that Israel may be undermining the very security goals it professes to seek.
By treating the new Syrian government as an enemy and violating Syria’s sovereignty daily, Israel risks turning a fragile neighbor into a determined adversary. The International Crisis Group cautions that if Israel persists on its current course, it could end up “pushing Syria toward one of the very scenarios it says it wants to avoid.”
In other words, a heavy-handed Israeli campaign might drive Syria’s rulers—who initially had no appetite for conflict with Israel—to ally with Iran or other anti-Israel forces out of desperation. Prominent geopolitical think tank Stratfor echoes this, noting that an open-ended Israeli military campaign “will harden anti-Israel attitudes” among Syrians and “could eventually push Syria back toward…Hezbollah and Iran.” Indeed, Syria’s new leadership, dominated by Sunni Islamist factions that long fought Assad, did not start out hostile to Israel—they were focused on building internal stability.
Turkey: A Brewing Confrontation?
There is also the risk of escalation beyond Syria’s borders. Israel’s actions have already raised tensions with other regional powers, particularly Turkey and Russia. Turkey, a key sponsor of the Syrian opposition and a close ally of the new government, has been positioning itself as a protector of the new Syria.
Ankara has even contemplated deploying its own military assets to Syria (such as at airbases in Homs province) as part of a joint defense pact with al-Sharaa’s government. This puts Turkey’s ambitions on a collision course with Israel’s. In late March 2025, Israel bombed several Syrian bases (T4, Palmyra, Hama) just as Turkish military teams were scouting them for possible use—a direct message of disapproval toward Turkey’s deeper involvement.
Turkish officials were alarmed; Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan accused Israel of “fueling regional instability” and noted that Israeli strikes were hampering the new Syrian government’s ability to fight ISIS and other extremist threats. While Fidan emphasized Turkey does not seek a confrontation with Israel, he warned that undermining Syria’s security could “drag the entire region back into chaos.”
The specter of two of the region’s strongest militaries—Israel and Turkey (a NATO member)—clashing over Syria is a new geopolitical flashpoint. If Israeli strikes were to accidentally kill Turkish personnel, or if Turkey decided to enforce a no-fly zone over parts of Syria to shield its interests, a direct conflict could erupt.
Such a scenario could quickly entangle the United States (which has ties to both allies) and Russia (which still has troops stationed in Syria’s coastal bases) in a broader crisis. Israeli commentators have begun to openly worry that “the border between Israel and Syria could escalate into an international conflict,” drawing in Turkey and even the US if mismanaged. Simply put, Israel’s freedom of action in Syria may be curtailed by the need to avoid a larger war with Turkey or other external powers.
Global Blowback and Diplomatic Isolation
Another limitation is the sustainability and legality of Israel’s presence in Syria. Thus far, Israel’s intervention has faced relatively muted international response—likely because global attention was absorbed by other crises and because Assad’s fall was so sudden.
However, as the situation settles, there could be growing international backlash against Israel’s unilateral actions. Syria’s foreign ministry has denounced Israel’s moves as a blatant violation of sovereignty and asked the UN Security Council to intervene. If the new Syrian government gains broader recognition, Israel could find itself under diplomatic pressure to pull back.
Even the US, while supportive of Israel’s security, might oppose a permanent Israeli occupation of Syrian territory, especially if it complicates Washington’s own Syria policy or counter-ISIS efforts. European and Arab countries might likewise view Israel’s behavior as destabilizing. Already, influential voices within Israel are urging a rethink.
Carmit Valensi, a former Israeli intelligence officer and analyst, warned that an indefinite military presence in Syria could be strategically counterproductive. She argued Israel should set clear conditions and a timeline (no more than six months) for withdrawing from the Syrian buffer zone, lest it become a quagmire that damages Israel’s international standing. These voices suggest that Israel’s current policy may be missing a diplomatic opening.
Resistance on the Ground: Echoes of the Past
Furthermore, on the ground, Israel’s tactics face the limits of local resistance. The more Israel pushes into Syrian territory, the higher the chance of Syrian factions—even those not aligned with Iran—taking up arms against the incursion.
The deadly incident in late March where villagers in southern Syria confronted Israeli troops is likely a sign of growing resentment. A long-term Israeli deployment in Syria could start to resemble its occupation of southern Lebanon in the 1980s-90s, when what was meant to be a security zone led to protracted low-intensity warfare with local militants (eventually giving rise to Hezbollah).
The danger of long-term instability is very real: by crippling the new Syrian state’s authority in the south and arming sectarian militias, Israel might inadvertently ignite a new round of civil strife in Syria. That chaos could, in time, produce exactly what Israel fears—ungoverned spaces where groups like ISIS regroup, or a populace so embittered that they welcome Iranian support for revenge. In trying to prevent worst-case outcomes, Israel may be creating new security threats that will haunt it in years to come.
A Strategy at Odds with Itself
Israel’s security-driven strategy in post-Assad Syria is a high-stakes gamble. It has achieved some immediate, tactical aims—eliminating remnants of Assad’s military and deterring Iran’s presence—but at the cost of straining Syria’s sovereignty and regional relations. The strategy’s built-in contradictions are becoming apparent.
Israel wants a stable border, yet its actions are destabilizing Syria’s border region. It seeks to keep Iran and Hezbollah out, yet its aggression might push Syria to invite them back for help. It wishes to be seen as a protector of minorities, yet by playing sectarian politics it could inflame sectarian conflict.
This strategy, born from fear of a hostile Syria, may instead be resurrecting the very threats it hoped to bury. Israel’s actions in post-Assad Syria may expand into an unpredictable and widening conflict—the very outcome it set out to prevent.
